Feature
A dozen years ago, a newly arrived resident of the Chesapeake Bay watershed asked an environmentally active local political leader if the bay was in danger of being neglected by the public and the politicians. "Never," came the reply. "People here love the bay too much to ever let anything bad happen to it, and the politicians know that."
Maybe he was wrong. There are signs that America's biggest and best-known estuary has slipped into disrepair, that the public is no longer certain the Chesapeake will be forever robust, and that the political leaders now lack the willpower needed to restore the bay's health. The very leader who said "never" a dozen years ago, retired Maryland state senator Bernie Fowler, was recently quoted as calling his beloved body of water "a disgrace." This is happening despite the unprecedented amount of attention that science has devoted to the bay over the past several years, and the unusual degree of scientist-policymaker collaboration that has guided the restoration program. Researchers from a dozen or more agencies and academic institutions are probing deep into the Chesapeake ecosystem, studying everything from the vigor of its oysters and crabs to the condition of its water column. They are anchoring automated buoys in the bay to transmit continuous data to their computer models. They offer their findings to the policymakers, primarily those from the states of Chesapeake Bay Restoration:
A Model of What? Richmond, Virginia, to Philadelphia and beyond. Photograph: Jacques Descloitres, MODIS Land Science Team.
In this satellite view of the Chesapeake Bay and environs, the peninsula separating the Chesapeake (center) from the Delaware Bay (upper right) is distinctly outlined by water. Tan-colored sediment is clearly visible where the Susquehanna River enters the Chesapeake Bay (top) and in the Potomac River near Washington, DC (center left). The spine of the Appalachian Mountains is visible (upper left), as is the dense development (white areas) that runs from
Maryland and Virginia, which form the greatest part of the bay's borders, but also those from farther reaches of the watershed in New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and West Virginia. They call their efforts "America's leading bay and river restoration program," a model for similar efforts elsewhere, such as San Francisco Bay, Puget Sound, the Great Lakes, and the Everglades. Almost everyone who cares about the bay's health believes that if restoration comes, it will be the result of what is called "sound science" that is accepted and put to use by policymakers. But many millions of dollars spent on that science are showing that the bay is in deplorable condition. Words such as "failing" and "dying" are frequently heard. Residents of the watershed are more likely to get their crabmeat and oysters at supermarkets than at the dock. The fish in the bay and its tributaries are so stuffed with PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls), mercury, and other contaminants that the states advise eating fish only in small amounts and at infrequent intervals. The bay's leading environmental organization, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, reports annually on the bay's health; the most recent evaluation was a "D."
The bay's biggest trouble is water quality, which has been degraded with an overabundance of nutrients-primarily phosphorus and nitrogen-that encourage destructive algal growth. The deterioration of submerged aquatic vegetation (SAV) is another huge problem, as are declines in species that depend on the bay, notably the native oyster, Crassostrea virginica, and the famed blue crab, Callinectes sapidus.
The causes of the bay's decline are the usual suspects: escalating population growth, which produces ever greater quantities of sewage, lawn chemicals, impermeable pavement, and lower-quality water; agriculture, which deposits tons of sediment and manure in the bay; diseases and overfishing, which have devastated the native oyster population; and vast areas of oxygen-deprived water that suffocates crabs and other aquatic life. The summer of 2005 was the worst ever measured for oxygen deprivation.
The watershed
The Chesapeake Bay is actually a great big river. When the Pleistocene ice sheet began its retreat some 18,000 years ago, ocean levels rose and flooded the continental shelf, including the nearby Susquehanna Valley. Today, the Susquehanna is the Bay's largest tributary, collecting water from as far away as south-central New York (see the box below).
At its outlet, in the Hampton RoadsNorfolk area of Virginia, the bay meets the Atlantic Ocean. The result is a salinity gradient that runs from oceanic saline water at one end to fresh water at the other, with many steps between. This, and the tidal action throughout its lower portion, accounts for the variety of animal and plant life in and around the bay-more than 3600 species, by one A waterman works on a winter morning in Maryland's Patuxent River, one of the Chesapeake's tributaries. Photograph: Mary Hollinger, NOAA.
The Chesapeake Bay is long (195 miles), big (3237 square miles), and shallow (only 25 feet deep, on average). It has 150 or more tributaries and 4600 miles of shoreline. The rivers and streams that feed the bay create a watershed (64,000 square miles) that covers parts of Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware, West Virginia, and New York.
It is 4 miles wide at its narrowest point (where two bridges connect the Eastern Shore to Annapolis, on the western side), and 30 miles wide near its mouth, at Cape Charles, Virginia. The tide ranges from about 3 feet at the mouth to 2 feet at the head of the bay; salinity runs from 30 parts per thousand at the mouth to 0 parts per thousand at the tributaries' fall lines.
Large portions of the bay suffer each year from areas of low oxygen, called "dead zones" by managers. The summer of 2005 was a particularly deadly one, with fishers finding traps full of suffocated crabs and reefs of dead oysters. The condition has been blamed on agricultural and industrial nutrients and warmer surface waters, which force living creatures to seek cooler depths, where there is less oxygen.
The bay was described in the late 1980s as the most productive of US bays: only the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans outproduce the bay in seafood, noted one accounting. But the bay's chroniclers now refer to its "historical productiveness," acknowledging that the Chesapeake's fruits are no longer so abundant. And that is a big reason why so many efforts are under way to restore it. The Chesapeake is also one of America's enduring cultural and historical treasures. Indians settled along the bay and successfully farmed its waters and lands. There was Revolutionary War combat along the Patuxent River, a Chesapeake tributary, and ironclads fought it out there during the Civil War. More recently, the bay has produced a culture best personified by the almost mythical person locally called the "waterman," a selfsufficient user of the water who drives a sweetly lined boat and has the aptitude to scoop up oysters and catch whatever else may be running, from crabs to rockfish to eels for the European and Asian markets.
The bay is in trouble for a number of reasons, but pressures from humans top most lists. Population growth along the shores of the bay and in the farther reaches of its watershed has flooded the estuary with air-, water-, and land-borne toxic substances, and lethal quantities of nutrients and sediments. This is happening despite a careful monitoring project that goes back to the 1950s, a multijurisdiction collaboration that started in the 1980s, the expenditure of many millions of dollars, and the efforts of numerous academic researchers. The situation is so bad that Theresa Pierno, then a vice president of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, last year told a congressional committee, "The Chesapeake Bay is dying as a result of pollution, and progress in reducing pollution has been insignificant in terms of improving the bay's health." And yet, Pierno said, the restoration effort is an example of scientific inquiry at its finest. "The Chesapeake Bay restoration effort has the best science of any major aquatic ecosystem in the world [in] identifying what the problems are, what solutions are needed, and mapping out a strategy for attainment," she said. "However, the resources and accountability have been insufficient to produce any significant progress in restoring the bay."
That is the dilemma that faces the bay and its keepers today: how to use the vast resources of science and experience to reverse, or halt or slow, the decline of the Chesapeake and to reawaken the public's faith that restoration can be accomplished-and how to sustain the interest and cooperation of elected and appointed officials from the multistate watershed.
Rich Batiuk is a veteran of the dialogue between science and policy. Batiuk, the Chesapeake Bay Program's executive director for science, has been with the program since 1985. He describes his job as "sitting on that fence-an occasionally sharp fence, shall we say, between the scientific community and the policymakers. It's not always comfortable."
The models
Today, mention of the "Chesapeake Bay model" means a computer-generated model, now in phase 5, that attempts to measure the bay's inputs and predict its future. In 1976, however, it meant a huge physical scale model of the bay, built by the US Army Corps of Engineers at a cost of $14 million. It occupied a nine-acre building on Maryland's Eastern Shore and was supposed to give scientists and engineers the ability to produce what-if scenarios to mimic tides, droughts, storms, and-a corps favorite-dredging for shipping channels. It was, the publicity said at the time, "a triumph of environmental values in a technological age."
The model turned out to be a massive, expensive flop, however. There was a problem in, among other things, simulating the actual bay's shallow vertical scale. And the computer age quickly turned the "triumph" into a dinosaur. The model was abandoned in 1983.
Models of other sorts have proliferated since 1976, when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began a five-year, $27 million study of the bay's environment. The outcome, known as the Chesapeake Bay Program, has grown into today's governmental partnershipperhaps the largest, most comprehensive, and most scientifically attuned undertaking of its kind. Out of it came the 1983 Chesapeake Bay Agreement, signed by the governors of Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, the mayor of the District of Columbia, and the EPA administrator. It promised little beyond the establishment of an executive council, but the agreement did serve as recognition that the bay was broken and important people felt a need to fix it. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation, founded in 1967, worked on the agreement, urging effort, offering expertise, and serving as a conduit to the public. During this period, the foundation's membership grew rapidly. It remains the premier environmental organization in the watershed today.
In 1987, a revised Chesapeake Bay Agreement offered much more detail. Chief among its promises was a reduction by at least 40 percent in the amount of nitrogen and phosphorus entering the bay's main stem by the year 2000. By the late 1980s, bay scientists and policymakers had effectively fixed upon the two nutrient chemicals, which came from both point and nonpoint sources, as the major threats to the bay's health. Other issues, which remain hot items today, were a paucity of dissolved oxygen, toxic inputs from soil and atmosphere, and sedimentation-and, of course, all those factors in combination.
Meantime, the bay's population of striped bass crashed in the 1980s, but a moratorium helped them recover-at about the same time that oyster stocks fell to new lows. In 1997, the microorganism Pfisteria piscida brought massive fish kills in several bay tributaries and sickness to some watermen. Many observers suspected a connection between the organism and the vast quantities of manure that pour off factory chicken farms on the Eastern Shore. In 1999, the EPA classified the bay as an "impaired water body."
By the beginning of the new century, it was obvious that the 1987 goals were overambitious. For all their research, the earlier planners had not understood the effects that nutrients, sediments, and toxic chemicals would have. Nor did they foresee the impact of population growth.
The restorers now saw that the bay was a moving target, changing from year to year, season to season, at the whims of climate, salinity, stochastic events, and its human population. Climate was a big factor. During a dry period, the quantity of nutrients entering the bay declines. During a wet year, runoff from the tributaries brings increased nutrient loads, and the bay suffers. (Inadequate wind took part of the blame for this year's record low in dissolved oxygen.)
The bay's circulation patterns and the quality of its water column proved trickier to study than researchers had thought. The authors of the 1987 goals pegged them at 40 percent reductions of nutrients from controllable sources in the states bordering the bay; they ignored the "uncontrollable" but significant atmospheric deposits and those from elsewhere in the watershed. Donald F. Boesch, president of the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, explains that "the 40 percent number was the best educated guess" at the time. But when all sources of nutrients were consideredthe uncontrollable as well as the controllable-the reduction "comes down to something like 22, 23, 24 percent. So we were pursuing what amounts to almost a dumbed-down goal from the getgo, at least from the standpoint of the nutrients." Boesch doubts that this was deliberate fudging."The problem was to basically account for progress by measuring process," he says, with "the public and decisionmakers thinking that significant progress was being made."
The restorers rerevised their goals. In their plans for a "Chesapeake 2000" agreement, developed in the late 1980s, the policymakers promised another impressive list of objectives. But still the tendency was to report process as progress. This all came to a head early in 2005, when the Washington Post reported that "halfway through a 10-year program to save the Chesapeake Bay, political leaders are acknowledging that the vaunted cleanup is faltering." The effort, wrote reporter David A. Fahrenthold, "has unraveled into what some environmentalists call a bureaucratic farce." The bay was little cleaner than it was when the Chesapeake 2000 deadlines were announced.
The Post article contributed to a wave of unaccustomed criticism of the Chesapeake Bay Program. A major target of critics was the program's reliance on computer modeling, which often seemed to crowd out real-world monitoring. One example is the reductions in nutrients that the models projected. The program pushed "best management practices" for nutrient handling and assumed that farmers would embrace them. That hasn't happened. William C. Baker, president of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, noted that the model "said that every farmer who had written a nutrient management plan" had actually implemented it."Two, it said that every one of those strategies in the nutrient management plan is working to perfection. And, three, that it will continue to work to perfection forever. That's being fed into the computer, and those, we think, are some of the false assumptions. Not all of them are being implemented, not all of the practices are working, and not all of the practices will continue forever unless there is a real continued effort to upgrade and update them and keep them working." The criticism stepped up a notch in November 2005 when the Government Accountability Office (GAO), responding to a request from Maryland and Virginia senators, accused the Chesapeake Bay Program of consistently overstating progress, failing to come up with an integrated approach to the ecosystem's problems, and doing an inadequate job of informing the public. The GAO proposed that President Bush name a task force to review the program. Program leaders replied that they had already begun curing the problems, and that they preferred scientifically based peer review to a politically appointed task force.
Oysters and weeds
The Chesapeake Bay is in more trouble today than ever before-or perhaps it is just being examined more thoroughly. Scott Phillips, a US Geological Survey (USGS) staffer, coordinates some 30 projects within the USGS, and serves as USGS liaison with the Chesapeake Bay Program's 16 federal agencies, six states, and the District of Columbia. In his 15 years with the program, he has seen a growing appreciation for the bay's problems and their complexity."I think some of the evolution we've seen has been because of improved science, "he says. As scientists peered more deeply into the bay in their search for ways to improve water quality, they uncovered other problems. "All this had to be addressed to really try to clean up water quality conditions in the bay, and to improve the population levels of the aquatic-dependent wildlife that is in the bay and its watershed," he says. "Resource managers also saw the large interconnection in the ecosystem that had to be addressed in its entirety. " Bay science has come a long way from the days of the Corps of Engineers' scale model.
Science has appreciated the value of submerged aquatic vegetation all along, but never more than now. Robert J. Orth, professor and SAV specialist at the Virginia Institute of Marine Science (VIMS) at Gloucester Point, Virginia, lists the ecosystem services performed by the grasses: They serve as a nursery for juvenile blue crabs, as food for waterfowl, and, in the form of microscopic animals that live on blades of grass, as nourishment for transient animals. They trap sediment and help stabilize shorelines.
"You see much more public awareness of the importance of these communities that wasn't there 30 years ago," says Orth."When I first got into it, most people thought of the stuff as weeds. As a matter of fact, there was an exotic that invaded the bay in the late '50s, called milfoil, and there were scientists who were dumping herbicides-literally nasty herbicides-to get rid of this plant."
Perhaps the most nagging and volatile challenge facing bay researchers and policymakers today is represented by two homely looking but very tasty animals: C. virginica and Crassostrea ariakensis, also known, respectively, as the Chesapeake Bay indigenous oyster and the Suminoe (or Asian) oyster. A staple of bay cuisine and culture since the days of the Indians and colonials, C. virginica is suffering from disease, loss of habitat, and overfishing. Crassostrea ariakensis is the oyster that many politicians and watermen want to put into the bay in hopes of replacing the native oyster and quickly restoring oyster stocks. To some, the Suminoe represents economic salvation; to others, it is a potentially dangerous introduced species. The oyster question, however it may be resolved, represents an important moment in the everlasting scuffle between science and policy. Whatever the outcome of the oyster debate, it might be said that this is the most carefully studied proposed deliberate introduction of a nonnative species in history.
Pressure from politicians and watermen in Virginia and Maryland to introduce the Suminoe began in 1991, when it became obvious that the population of native oysters had crashed. In Maryland alone, the catch went from 15 million bushels in 1885, to 1.6 million bushels in 1986, down to 26,000 bushels in 2004. Almost everyone agrees that the causes are, in the words of one assessment, "heavy fishing pressure and habitat degradation during the 19th and 20th centuries and recent high mortalities due to the diseases Dermo and MSX" (see the box on the next page).
Watermen and politicians want the Asian oyster, which has shown resistance to the two diseases, to be planted in the bay. An introduction would give the bay's dwindling supply of watermen and oyster processors something to catch and sell. Others, including environmental- ists, scientists, and some legislators, are more cautious. In 2002 they asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a risk-benefit study of introducing nonnative oysters, either as relatively infertile triploids or as reproductively capable diploids, into the bay. Maryland Governor Robert L. Ehrlich Jr. wanted quick introduction. In June 2003 he announced a plan to introduce fertile Asians into the bay, and to do so before the NAS report was completed. His strategy was not realized, and in November 2004 Ehrlich sent a letter to the EPA administrator asking him to halt EPA scientists' calls for additional research on the introduced species. The governor said he was all for science-based decisions, but "I am committed to moving forward in a timely manner." The NAS study, when it came in August 2003, was replete with cautions: An illegal release might bring undesirable hitchhiking organisms (in fact, the introduction of another Asian strain had brought the diseases MSX and Dermo into the bay years ago); the existing regulatory and institutional framework was inadequate for overseeing such a project; and it's impossible,"given the current state of knowledge, to predict whether the little-studied Suminoe oyster will be a boon or an ecological disaster."
As might be expected, the report recommended more research-at least five more years of it-as did a panel of scientists at a Chesapeake Bay Program workshop convened by the program's Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee. In March 2005, the Maryland legislature voted, against Ehrlich's wishes, to require the state's Department of Natural Resources to conduct the research recommended by NAS. Donald Boesch credits NAS for halting an indiscriminate introduction. "Heaven help us," he says, "if we didn't have that National Academy study, because now you can say, 'Well, the National Academy says these are the things we need to do.'" Meantime, the watermen increased their pressure. In November 2005, the Virginia Seafood Council asked the state's Marine Resources Commission to plant 10,000 nominally sterile Asian oysters into a Cheaspeake tributary, rather than wait for scientific assessments to be completed. A Seafood Council director was quoted as saying, "The time is now to move forward unencumbered by the endless emphasis on risks."
The oyster research continues, much of it at VIMS. Scientists there manipulate the eggs of fertile (diploid) Asian oysters into a presumably nonfertile (triploid) form. It is not an easy task, says Stan Allen, director of aquaculture breeding at VIMS, and some of the "infertile" offspring are likely to revert to fertile status. VIMS research so far has shown that the Asian oysters are not affected by MSX and, though they may become infected by Dermo, the disease does not progress to lethal stages before the oyster reaches market size and reproductive age.
Those who want or don't want fertile Asian oysters introduced now command center stage in the oyster debate, but there are others who still have faith in the indigenous oyster. Stan Allen has done considerable work at VIMS toward building disease resistance into C. virginica through the classic techniques of hybridization. Allen believes this works best in an aquaculture setting. "I'm absolutely, 100 percent convinced that we're going down the right road in terms of promoting aquaculture development with the native species," he says. But it will take years before researchers know whether this is a reliable restoration process. And oyster fishers and politicians are in a hurry.
Other challenges
The Chesapeake Bay faces other, equally vexing challenges. Nutrients from both point sources (the 66 large sewage treatment plants in the bay's watershed) and nonpoint sources (agricultural and urban fertilizers, manure, and other nutrients) are not declining at the rates projected by the Chesapeake Bay agreements. There has been some progress on point sources, thanks to Maryland's 2004 usage fee for household septic systems and federal demands for upgrading of sewage treatment plants. But nonpoint depositions continue to come from the atmosphere and from agriculture.
There are rules and laws on the books that nominally control nutrients and runoff from agriculture, but they are not vigorously followed or enforced. A 2004 survey found that Virginia rarely inspected farmers' environmental practices, though yearly inspections were required. In Maryland, where farmers are obliged to file nutrient management Dermo is Perkinsus marinus, a parasite first found in the bay in 1949. An infected oyster can suffer reduced growth rate and reproductive capacity. MSX, which stands for "multinucleated sphere unknown," is Haplosporidium nelsoni. It was found in the bay in the late 1950s. The spore-forming protozoan has been studied for years, but much remains to be learned about it. Eugene M. Burreson, a student of marine diseases at the Virginia Institute of Marine Science, monitors for the killers.
Burreson says, "The big unknown with MSX is that we don't know its life cycle. We have pretty good evidence that it's not a direct transmission from oyster to oyster-that there's some other organism out there that it has to go through that provides the source infectious material to the oyster. We've never been able to identify that. It's the most frustrating research I've ever been involved in." Burreson can predict when MSX will strike. The clue comes from higher salinity, which in the Chesapeake can result from low rainfall conditions. By contrast, researchers know a great deal about Dermo. "We know all about the life stages," says Burreson. "We can manage around it. We know it takes a couple of years before you get serious mortality, so if you can get oysters to market size in 12 to 18 months, you can sort of work around Dermo. MSX is a very virulent organism. It comes in and kills oysters within a month." plans with the state, only about half of them did so by the deadline, despite the threat of a $250 fine. In January 2005, the EPA announced that operators of factory animal-feeding farms could escape prosecution for violations of the Clean Air Act and other environmental rules if they paid a fee and collected their emissions data. Around the bay, this could include huge poultry factories that produce enormous amounts of chicken manure. Governor Ehrlich had already announced that Maryland would drop its rules holding large chicken processorssuch as Tyson Foods and Perdue Farmsresponsible for chicken feces that flush into the bay. The governor said he wanted to allow contract farmers and processors "to earn a living without excessive government intrusion."
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation, which in 2003 had asked EPA to enforce nutrient limits, finally filed a petition, a prelude to a lawsuit, accusing the agency of failure to enforce the Clean Water Act. When the EPA did respond, more than two years after the original request, it denied the petition and said its restoration policies were working. Then the foundation said it was pleased with the EPA response. The litigation ended. Some critics said the foundation was engaging in 1960s-style environmentalism, trying to work within a system that had no intentions of changing.
Another obstacle to progress in bay restoration is cost. There have been various estimates about what a proper cleanup would cost-from $1 billion to $30 billion, with most estimates hovering around $15 billion. Many students of the effort agree with the Chesapeake Bay Foundation's Baker that the "one certainty" is that "it will never be as inexpensive to fix the Chesapeake Bay as it is today."
Federal enthusiasm for expenditures does not match that of the restorers. The current national budget reduces spending for Chesapeake programs for the second time in two years. The Chesapeake is not alone in suffering funding setbacks. Last October, the Bush administration pulled back from a planned $20 billion program to restore the Great Lakes, another body of water in great need of help.
Blame
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation's slogan, seen on everything from bumper stickers to its e-mail headings, is "Save the Bay." William Baker is one of several who fear that the Chesapeake may, in fact, not be saved. "We used to say repeatedly that if you can do it here, you can use that model anywhere else in the world in addressing complex environmental systems. This is somewhat rhetorical, but it's actually true: we're worried now that it may be a model of failure, and not a model of success." And if that happens, who's to blame? "It's everybody who points the finger and says, 'Don't come to me; go somewhere else,'" says Baker. "So you get the farmers pointing at the developers, and you get the developers pointing at the industrial folks, and you get the industrial folks pointing at the sewage treatment plants, and you get the sewage treatment plants and everybody else in Maryland and Virginia pointing at Pennsylvania. And whenever you point your finger at somebody, three fingers come pointing back at you. "So our message has always been that we've all got to do better, and we're going to come down on each and every one of us-including ourselves, and the amount we drive, the amount of fertilizer we put on our lawns, sometimes the number of rockfish we catch. We've all got to do a better job." 
